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Abstract
We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High
ATM fees degrade the value of competitors’ deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as
a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account
diﬀerentiation. Our empirical framework can empirically distinguish surcharging motivated by
this strategic concern from surcharging that simply maximizes ATM profit considered as a stand-
alone operation. The results are consistent with such behavior by large banks, but not by small
banks. For large banks, the eﬀect of incompatibility seems to operate through higher deposit
account fees rather than increased deposit account base.
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2‘ATM surcharges may put small banks–or, more accurately, banks that do not
own many ATMs–at a disadvantage...[Surcharges] may induce small-bank customers
to move their deposit accounts to the larger banks, resulting in increased concentration
in local banking markets.’
– from ‘Competition in ATM Markets,’ Congressional Budget Oﬃce (1998)
1 Introduction
In recent years the economics of incompatibility have moved to the forefront of policy debates. The
generic issue is something like this: A firm produces two products, which may be more valuable when
consumed together. The firm faces competition in one or both markets. In principle, consumers
can “mix and match” the firm’s products with those of its competitors, but the firm decides to
restrict consumers’ ability to do so, eﬀectively forcing them to buy both of its products together.
Antitrust concerns over this behavior are common. In computers, Microsoft is held to have used
a variety of technical and contractual restriction to link products in this way.1 In media and
telecommunications markets, the prospect that owners of “bottleneck” facilities might use that
advantage to acquire market power in other markets is an ongoing concern.2 Kodak allegedly
used contractual restrictions to deny users of its copiers the ability to use independent service and
parts for repairs.3 Printer manufacturer Lexmark was sued for restricting consumers’ ability to
use third-party toner cartridges in its printers. Terminology in these cases varies–some refer to
incompatibility, others refer to access or interconnection pricing, and others term this behavior
tying–but the economic question is the same in each case: when will a firm attempt to restrict
access across related markets, and when will that strategic behavior be successful?4
1See Genakos et al. (2005) for an empirical examination of the OS/server issue, in which Microsoft allegedly
degraded the interoperability of its OS with rivals’ server software. The antitrust suit against Microsoft alleged that
Microsoft tied both Internet Explorer and its Java platform to Windows in order to maintain its Windows monopoly.
See, e.g., Gilbert and Katz (2001) for a discussion.
2The government’s case against the AOL/Time Warner merger alleged that the merged entity could harm Internet
Service Provider competition by denying competitors access to Time Warner’s cable lines, and this issue dictated
the terms of merger approval (which mandated that Time Warner provide open access to competing ISPs). In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the concern that local exchange carriers could leverage their monopoly from switches
to related markets drove the imposition of regulated access pricing.
3See Mackie-Mason and Metzler (2004) for a discussion.
4See Whinston (1990) for a clear exposition of the intuitive link between tying, interconnection degradation, and
incompatibility.
3In this paper we provide an empirical framework for examining this question, using data from
ATM markets. Banks oﬀer both ATM cards and ATM services as a bundle to their depositors.
They also oﬀer other banks’ customers access to their ATMs, but impose a per-use surcharge for
each such transaction. Surcharges are closest to the telecommunication example; they are an access
fee for oﬀ-network transactions. The allegation (highlighted by the quote above) is that large banks
use surcharges to create incompatibility between their ATMs and other banks’ cards, degrading the
value of their competitors’ deposit accounts and creating competitive advantage in that market.5
The particular diﬃculty in ATM markets is that banks might impose surcharges simply to
maximize profits in their ATM business, considered as a stand-alone entity. This makes it hard
to distinguish behavior intended to maximize profits within a market from behavior intended to
maximize profits across markets. Do high ATM surcharges reflect an intent to create competitive
advantage in the deposit account market? Or, do they merely reflect a profit-maximizing response
to ATM demand? This is of particular concern in our setting; while there has been some empirical
work establishing that surcharges are correlated with changes in deposit market outcomes, that
work has not attempted to disentangle strategic behavior from other explanations (such as omitted
variables aﬀecting both markets).6 More generally, while there is a substantial theoretical literature
identifying the conditions under which incompatibility reflects a strategic motive, there has been
little work attempting to empirically identify strategic incompatibility.7
To distinguish surcharging that maximizes ATM profits from strategic incompatibility, we first
estimate the firm-level surcharge that would maximize ATM profits without any regard to the
deposit market. Our identification strategy benefits from a natural experiment. Prior to 1996
banks were largely barred from imposing surcharges; after the restriction was lifted, surcharging
became widespread.8 This regime change in surcharging allows us to estimate the elasticity of
residual demand for foreign ATM transactions. With the elasticity in hand and information on
marginal cost, we can estimate the optimal stand-alone surcharge for each firm.
5Throughout the paper, our definition of ‘large’ matches that in the quote above: we measure bank size based on
share of ATMs in local (county) markets rather than the national market.
6Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006) discuss this endogeneity issue, but do not estimate by how much strategic
behavior distorts surcharges. Hannan et al. (2003) focus on the reduced form link between bank characteristics and
surcharges without attempting to test whether surcharging is a form of strategic incompatibility.
7Early theoretical work developing the economics of such markets includes that of Matutes and Regibeau (1988,
1992), Economides (1989) and Chou and Shy (1990). Later work focusing on incompatibility includes Church and
Gandal (1992, 1996, 2000), Economides and Salop (1992). Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996) discuss the
strategic use of access fees, and Economides (1998) relates the access issue to telecommunications markets and the
Microsoft case.
8Some states permitted surcharging before 1996; we account for this in the empirical work below.
4We then measure diﬀerences at the bank level between actual surcharges and our estimated
optimal stand-alone surcharges: we call this diﬀerence the incompatibility premium. We find that
banks with a large share of ATMs in their local markets have much higher incompatibility premia
than small banks (those with low ATM shares in their local markets); in fact, for small banks the
average incompatibility premium is quite close to zero. This is consistent with the view that small
firms have little motive or ability to restrict access for competitive advantage, but that large banks
do have such a motive. We also estimate a model that can in principle reveal the parameters of
interest to a bank: the partial derivatives of deposit account prices and quantities with respect
to surcharging. In the models where we impose the most structure on the data, the parameters
suggest that in our sample the strategic incompatibility motive stems from higher deposit fees,
rather than increased quantity in the deposit account market.
Because the partial equilibrium incentives for incompatibility need not correlate with equilib-
rium outcomes in any systematic way, we also estimate the relationship between the incompati-
bility premium and changes in deposit account prices, card account base and ATM deployment
after surcharging.9 In these empirical models, we condition on actual surcharges and measure the
correlation between outcomes and the incompatibility premium. We find little evidence that in-
compatibility is associated with increases in either deposit account fees or card base; there is some
evidence that banks engaging in strategic incompatibility increase their ATM deployment.10
To our knowledge, ours is the first empirical study to estimate the degree to which firm behavior
is distorted by incentives for incompatibility. It is closely related to work by Genakos et al. (2004),
9Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006) conduct a similar test that correlates surcharges with changes in deposit
market outcomes; we condition on surcharges and estimate the correlation between changes and our estimated
incompatibility premium.
10Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006) find a positive correlation between surcharges and gains in deposit share
for large banks. Hannan et al. (2003) establish that large banks charge higher surcharges, using data from 1998, and
also find that large banks are more likely to impose surcharges in markets with a high inflow of new customers–a
result that they argue is consistent with the leveraging motive. But, they find little support for the notion that large
banks are motivated by an attempt to steal existing customers from small banks. Prager (2001) finds no evidence
that surcharges are correlated with deposit share losses by small banks, although her definition of “small” is based
on national size and includes many banks with high local market share. Hannan (2005) does find evidence that
large banks gain share in states with surcharges relative to a state that banned them, but is unable to undertake
any cross-sectional analysis related to surcharging and the incompatibility motive because he does not observe actual
surcharges.
The more structural work in Ishii (2005) and Knittel and Stango (2004) both find, using diﬀerent data, that
the data fit a model where consumers value ATMs and ATM access, and consider both when making their deposit
account decisions. The estimated parameters in Ishii (2005) also suggest an economically significant role for strategic
incompatibility.
5which estimates the incentive for incompatibility, but does not measure the equilibrium behavior
generated by such an incentive. More generally, our work adds to the empirical literature on
compatibility and competitive strategy.11
2 ATM Markets
Banks oﬀer a variety of financial products, but we focus on two: ATMs and ATM cards. Together,
the two allow electronic withdrawals from deposit accounts.12 Banks bundle cards and access to
their ATMs together in the standard set of service oﬀerings to depositors. Banks price those bundles
using monthly fees, service charges and implicit income on deposits. Survey evidence and previ-
ous empirical work suggests that access to ATMs is an important deposit account characteristic,
diﬀerentiating banks both horizontally and vertically.13
Because banks operate on shared networks, customers can use their ATM cards at other banks’
ATMs: these are called foreign transactions. Each foreign transaction generates two fees: a switch
fee paid by the cardholder’s bank to the network, and an interchange fee paid by the cardholder’s
bank to the ATM owner.14 A foreign transaction may also generate a foreign fee paid by the
cardholder to the cardholder’s bank. Foreign transactions are common during our sample period,
comprising roughly thirty-five percent of all ATM transactions in 1996.15
Prior to 1996, the major ATM shared networks (PLUS and Cirrus) prohibited ATM owners from
imposing surcharges when non-customers used their machines. While some states had overridden
this prohibition before 1996, most had not. In 1996, the networks rescinded the ban and surcharges
became widespread. From 1997-1999, most banks adopted surcharges, and they are currently nearly
11Early work in this literature (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Kemerer [1996], Gandal [1994, 1995] and Greenstein [1993]
seeks to identify a first-order eﬀect of compatibility on pricing and firm behavior. Later work has focused on a much
richer set of questions, such as the welfare eﬀects of competition between incompatible networks (Rysman [2003],
Shankar and Bayus [2003], Ohashi [2003]), and firm strategies such as preannouncements (Dranove and Gandal
[2003]).
12Dove Consulting (1999, 2002) finds that in both 1999 and 2002, roughly eighty percent of ATM transactions were
cash withdrawals. Deposits and inquiries comprise roughly ten percent each.
13Knittel and Stango (2004) find that deposit account prices are correlated with banks’ ATM fleet size, after the
advent of surcharging.
14See McAndrews (2003) for a discussion of these fees. The Bank Network News periodically reports fees for the
largest ATM/debit networks.
15We take this figure from data in the Bank Network News, various years. It matches quite well with the 38%
average figure in Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006).
6universal. It is this regime change that provides the primary source of identification in the data;
as we show below, surcharging had first-order eﬀects on consumer and firm behavior. It also led
to allegations that surcharges were anti-competitive, based on the strategic incompatibility motive
for large banks.
2.1 The Network Economics of ATMs and Fees
The underlying economics in ATM markets are intuitively similar to a variety of other markets.
ATMs and cards are a set of mix and match products: components that consumers use to con-
struct a composite good–an ATM transaction.16 Such composite goods are common; examples
include audio/visual systems, computer systems and hardware/software systems more generally,
and many others.17 In these markets, it is often true that competing firms not only choose prices
for their components, but also choose whether their components are compatible with those of their
competitors.18 Surcharging is a form of partial incompatibility; higher surcharges impose costs for
using a card with an ATM owned by a diﬀerent bank.
The motive for incompatibility in these markets is well-known. In ATM markets, the clearest
exposition of this motive is found in Massoud and Bernhardt (2002, 2003). Massoud and Bernhardt
(2002) present a model in which customers make a two-stage decision–first of a bank, then for
ATM use, given their bank choice and ATM fees. Higher surcharges depress willingness to pay
for competitors’ deposit accounts, by increasing ATM costs associated with those other accounts.
Banks consider this, and it gives them an incentive to impose surcharges in order to attract deposit
account customers from competitors. Attracting such consumers is valuable because a firm can
engage in price discrimination for ATM services on its deposit account customers, but not on its
foreign ATM users.
The conclusions reached by Massoud and Bernhardt are broadly consistent with those reached
by other theoretical models in which firms choose compatibility. First, the strategic motive is
highly dependent on market structure; incompatibility is typically unattractive when one or more
of the component markets is perfectly competitive. Massoud and Bernhardt assume imperfect
competition, but it is quite easy to see that in their model the incentive for strategic incompatibility
disappears if the deposit account market is competitive. Second, Massoud and Bernhardt also find
16To our knowledge Matutes and Regibeau (1988) coined this term.
17See Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Farrell and Klemperer (2005) for surveys.
18How providers of complementary products set separate prices for their goods is not a relevant issue in our case,
because own ATM access and deposit account services are bundled; there is a single price for both products.
7that large firms (i.e., those with greater share of ATMs) have greater incentives for incompatibility.
This is also a common feature of other studies.
This intuition has also been advanced in other settings. Economides, Lopomo and Woroch
(1996) examine a very similar theoretical question, but in the context of telecommunications access.
In telecommunications, the owner of a bottleneck facility (such as local switches) may charge an
excessive price for access to that facility–excessive, in the sense that it is motivated by a desire to
steal customers in a related market from competitors, and exceeds the stand-alone monopoly price
for the bottleneck facility.
2.2 Theoretical Implications of Strategic Incompatibility
While there is substantial theoretical support for strategic incompatibility, there has been very
little empirical work on the subject. Here we provide a framework that is directly applicable in any
instance where firms might use interconnection degradation or access pricing as the mechanism for
incompatibility. The intuition is closely related to the empirical framework independently developed
by Genakos et al. (2004) for identifying strategic interoperability degradation.19
Consider a bank oﬀering both ATM services and ATM cards. Its profits in the two markets are:
πi = πAi + π
C
i , (1)
where πAi represents profits from foreign ATM transactions and π
C
i are profits from ATM cards
(deposit accounts).20 The choice variable of interest is si, the surcharge paid by non-customers
19In both settings a firm with market power sells complementary products and faces competition. In their study, a
PC OSmonopolist reduces interoperability of the PC OS with competitors’ server OSs. This reduces the attractiveness
of the competitors’ server OS product and increases profits. In our case, the ATM owner reduces the interoperability
of its ATMs with competitors’ cards, reducing the attractiveness of those cards and increasing profits. In both cases,
a key empirical prediction is that market share and the leveraging motive are positively correlated.
Despite the similarity of the two studies there are both conceptual diﬀerences and diﬀerences in implementation.
First, the motive for reduced interoperability in Genakos et al. (2004) is foreclosure to achieve price discrimination.
In our setting inducing exit is not a motive. Price discrimination is important, however; as Massoud and Bernhardt
discuss, banks can engage in second degree price discrimination against their deposit account customers but not
foreign ATM users. It is this that motivates stealing customers from other firms. A second conceptual diﬀerence is
that Genakos et al. estimate an incentive for reducing interoperability, in partial equilibrium. They find that such
an incentive exists and is large. Our approach examines the actual level of interoperability (because we observe a
quantifiable metric of it), and estimates by how much interoperability is distorted by the leveraging motive.
20Profits from deposit accounts also include the implicit profits associated with own customers’ use of own ATMs.
8using the bank’s ATMs. In all of this analysis, we abstract away from the existence of foreign fees,
to highlight the role of surcharges. We do account for them in the empirical work below.
While a surcharge does not directly aﬀect deposit account demand and profits, a surcharge
makes its competitors’ deposit accounts less valuable to their customers, by increasing the expected
fees that they pay. This may increase deposit account profits by making the surcharging bank’s
deposit accounts relatively more attractive. If the bank maximizes profits across the two markets,
it will solve:
∂πAi
∂si
+
∂πCi
∂si
= 0. (2)
This will yield the profit-maximizing surcharge:
s∗∗i = arg max(π
A
i + π
C
i ). (3)
If we write profits in the two markets more completely as:
πAi =
³
si + k − cA
´
QAi Ai, (4)
πCi =
³
pCi − cCi
´
QCi , (5)
where si is bank i’s surcharge, k is the interchange fee (common across banks), cA is the marginal
cost of an ATM transaction (also common across banks), QAi is bank i’s per-ATM demand for
foreign transactions, Ai is its number of ATMs, pCi is firm i’s deposit account price, c
C
i is marginal
cost of deposit accounts and QCi is the number of depositors (ATM cards). Assuming firms compete
in prices, the optimal surcharge is:21
s∗∗i = s
∗
i + Z
∗
i , (6)
where
s∗i = −k + cA −
Ã
∂QAi
∂si
!−1
QAi , (7)
21This simplifies the problem by focusing on the decision to surcharge conditional on equilibrium ATM deployment
Ai. Of course, it is likely that ATM deployment is itself aﬀected by surcharging (see, e.g., Ishii [2006]). In the
empirical work below we condition on the number of ATMs; if (in the extreme) the only eﬀect of surcharging is
to increase the number of ATMs and not to increase the optimal surcharge conditional on ATM deployment, we
will understate the eﬀect of surcharging. Below, we conduct some complementary empirical analysis of whether
surcharging and strategic incompatibility are related to changes in ATM deployment.
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Z∗i = −
Ã
Ai
∂QAi
∂si
!−1
∂pCi
∂si
QCi −
Ã
Ai
∂QAi
∂si
!−1 ³
pCi − cCi
´ ∂QCi
∂si
. (8)
This decomposes the optimal surcharge into two parts. The first is s∗i , the surcharge that maxi-
mizes profits in the ATM market, considered as a stand-alone business. This stand-alone surcharge
is similar to (with some re-arranging) the familiar expression for the Lerner index describing the
price-cost markup, where the “price” from surcharging is si+k and marginal cost is cA. The second
component Z∗i is what we term the incompatibility premium; it is the diﬀerence between the actual
surcharge and the stand-alone surcharge. If incompatibility increases deposit account demand the
incompatibility premium will be positive, i.e. Z∗i > 0 and s
∗∗
i > s
∗
i .
Writing the expression this way illustrates the factors driving both stand-alone surcharging and
strategic incompatibility. First, the stand-alone surcharge s∗i is increasing in marginal cost, foreign
transaction demand QAi and the slope of residual demand for foreign ATM transactions,
∂QAi
∂si
. The
expression for Z∗i shows that there are two motives for strategic incompatibility: higher deposit
account prices (if
∂pCi
∂si
> 0) or more depositors (if ∂Q
C
i
∂si
> 0). The first of these eﬀects is larger
when the bank has more depositors QCi ; having a large base of cards Ai or heavy ATM usage Q
A
i is
more important if incompatibility leads to higher deposit account prices. Both the first and second
eﬀects are decreasing in Ai and increasing in the slope of residual demand
∂QAi
∂si
because strategic
incompatibility involves deviating from stand-alone ATM profit maximization and doing so is more
costly when a bank has many ATMs or foreign transaction demand is very sensitive to surcharges.
In the cross-section, it is likely that the incentives for strategic incompatibility vary. Because
they have both more cards and more ATMs, banks with many ATMs in their local markets will find
incompatibility more attractive. It is also likely that the ability to siphon deposit share
µ
∂QCi
∂si
¶
is
stronger for banks with a large ATM fleet (this is elucidated by Massoud and Bernhardt [2002]). In
the empirical work below, we examine these cross-sectional eﬀects by splitting the sample by size;
we denote as large any bank with an ATM share in its local markets above the sample median, and
as small any bank with a share below the sample median (13%).
2.3 Empirical Tests for Strategic Incompatibility
Here we outline a series of empirical tests that can in principle reveal both the partial equilibrium
(private) incentives for incompatibility, and can also shed light on the equilibrium eﬀects of such
behavior when there are many firms in the market. We first estimate the optimal stand-alone
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surcharge at the firm level, sˆ∗it; by the identity Z
∗
i ≡ s∗∗i −s∗i , this also estimates the incompatibility
premium Z∗i . Our simplest test of whether surcharging reflects a strategic motive is to compare
actual surcharges to estimated optimal stand-alone surcharges; if they are equal, this implies that
Z∗i = 0. We also ask whether banks with a large share of local ATMs–who may find strategic
incompatibility more worthwhile–have higher estimates of Z∗i than smaller banks.
Our second test imposes more structure on the data, by fitting the first-order condition described
in equations 6-8. If surcharges merely reflect stand-alone profit maximization then equation (7)
should be well-specified. Another way of putting this is that a bank with no strategic motive for
surcharges will set s∗∗i = s
∗
i , meaning that in the cross-section the coeﬃcient in a regression of
actual on estimated stand-alone surcharges should be one. If on the other hand actual surcharges
reflect a strategic motive, then a model containing the additional term in equation (8) should fit
the data better. We can also use this model to uncover some parameters of interest–the partial
derivatives of profit with respect to surcharges.22 Again, we estimate this model for both large and
small banks.
Finally, we use data from the three years following surcharging’s inception to examine the
equilibrium eﬀects of both surcharging and strategic incompatibility in deposit markets. These
tests are motivated by the fact that while firms may have private incentives for incompatibility, the
oligopoly equilibrium eﬀects of such behavior are ambiguous. In many models where firms choose
compatibility but are symmetric, a prisoners dilemma-type eﬀect occurs where all firms choose
“too much” incompatibility, but it has no equilibrium eﬀects on market shares (though welfare and
prices may change). This occurs in Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) when banks are symmetric.
To explore the equilibrium relationship between incompatibility and outcomes, we examine how
incompatibility is correlated with three variables: ATM cards (deposit accounts), average deposit
account fees and ATM deployment. We examine how changes in the variables over the period
following surcharging are correlated with the levels of both surcharges and the incompatibility
premium.
22Technically we can only estimate the interaction between (unobserved) deposit price-cost margins and the partial
derivative of depositors with respect to surcharges,
¡
pCi − cCi
¢ ∂QCi
∂si
.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We take our data from the Card Industry Directory, an annual publication listing data for the
largest ATM card issuers in the United States. The Card Industry Directory contains information
on total ATM cards, total ATMs owned and ATM fees (surcharge and foreign). It also contains the
total number of transactions on the bank’s ATMs. We cross-reference these data with the FDIC
Reports of Condition and Income (or “Call Reports”), and the FDIC Summary of Deposits data.
These other sources provide us with bank-level information about local markets. Most important,
we observe both a bank’s deposit share (across all of its local markets if it operates in more than one)
and the population density of the markets that the bank serves. Using data on ATM deployment
and market share, we construct a bank’s share of ATMs in its local markets.23 A bank’s ATM
share is important because in much of our analysis we compare the behavior of banks with high
market share to that of banks with low market share–the idea being that large banks should have
a stronger incentive for incompatibility.24 Population density is also important because ATM use
involves travel and travel costs may be higher in dense markets; in related work, we have found
that population density is strongly correlated with cross-market diﬀerences in ATM and deposit
account pricing.25
A further advantage of the cross-referenced data is that it allows us to estimate the foreign fees
and surcharges charged by a bank’s competitors in its local markets; we can then control for these
fees in the empirical work. We estimate competitors’ fees by exploiting the fact that bank size is
strongly correlated with both surcharging and foreign fees (as we illustrate in Table 1 below). Thus,
the size distribution of a bank’s local competitors is a good proxy for the fees charged by those
competitors.26 As it turns out, this is not critical for our analysis, as we are primarily interested in
23ATM share is calculated as the deposit-weighted ATM share across all markets. For example, if a bank has 20%
of its deposits in a market where its ATM share is 30%, and 80% of its deposits in a market where its ATM share is
10%, the weighted average ATM share is (0.20)(0.30)+(0.80)(0.10)=0.14, or 14%.
The Card Industry Directory contains information on the top 200 ATM deployers. These data account for over
60% of national ATMs, in a given year; this requires us to impute ATM data for small deployers. We use a regression
technique that in previous work we have found to be accurate. We refer the reader to Knittel and Stango (2004) for
the specifics.
24Ideally, we could exploit cross-sectional variation in relative deposit and ATM shares, but ATM and deposit
shares are too highly correlated for this to be a useful exercise.
25See Knittel and Stango (2003) for evidence on this point.
26We estimate competitors’ fees by running a within-sample regression of fees on bank size dummies, local market
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how a bank’s own surcharges aﬀect its own transaction demand. Further, there is not much scope
for mis-measuring within-bank variation in competitors’ fees over time, because foreign fees do not
change much at all in our sample, and variation in competitors’ surcharging is almost exclusively
a 0/1 transition before and after 1996. Nonetheless this measure does provide us with some useful
complementary information.27
Table 1 presents summary data for our relevant bank-level variables during the sample period
1994-1999. The data are an unbalanced panel, with roughly 150 observations per year for 210 banks.
In order to clarify some of the cross-sectional diﬀerences across card issuers, we classify banks as
being “large” if they have a ATM share in their local markets that is above the sample median
(13%), and “small” otherwise.28 Large banks impose higher surcharges and foreign fees than smaller
banks. The former is consistent with strategic incompatibility, but could also reflect a systematic
diﬀerence in the elasticity of residual demand for foreign transactions; it will be important to control
for this possibility in the empirical work. The latter may reflect diﬀerential price discrimination,
although this is diﬃcult to establish with certainty.29 While surcharges change dramatically over
the sample period, foreign fees rise only slightly (at roughly the inflation rate). Large banks begin
the sample with a higher average level of transactions per ATM, but this relationship reverses
by the end of the sample. Large banks appear to be more aggressive in deploying ATMs when
measured relative to cards; the ratio of cards per ATM is lower for large banks and falls for large
banks, while remaining stable for small banks.
We present the data stratified in this way to illustrate two points. First, there are significant
cross-sectional diﬀerences in the degree to which banks impose surcharges. These are largely con-
sistent with theory; large banks impose higher surcharges. However, this should not be viewed as
conclusive evidence of the strategic behavior that interests us, as large banks could simply face a
population density, year eﬀects and interactions between the variables. We then use these coeﬃcients to predict out
of sample for the remaining banks, and average these fitted values by deposit share for each local market. We discuss
the procedure in more detail in Knittel and Stango (2004).
27As we discuss in Knittel and Stango (2004), our results are robust to a number of alternative imputation methods.
Moreover, our estimates of the key parameter here (the slope of residual demand for a bank’s own ATM transactions,
with respect to its own surcharge) are identical whether we include estimated competitors’ fees or just condition only
on fees that we observe with certainty (i.e., a bank’s own surcharge and foreign fee).
28We have also estimated bank’s local ATM shares and classified them based on that variable; the two are nearly
perfectly correlated, so the results do not depend much on which measure we use.
29We do not observe the bank-level menu of checking fees–some of these exhibit nonlinear pricing of foreign trans-
actions. It is not uncommon for banks to give five free foreign transactions per month on certain checking accounts.
In any event, as we noted above, our residual demand analysis uses within-firm changes in fees for identification;
foreign fees do not change much at the firm level in our data.
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lower elasticity of residual demand. A second point regarding these data is that they illustrate the
first-order eﬀects of surcharges on consumer and firm behavior; per-ATM transactions fell by 30%
after the advent of surcharges.30 This provides a useful identifying source of variation in the data.
3.2 Estimating Residual Demand and Stand-Alone Surcharges
Beginning with Equation (7) above, if the residual demand for foreign transactions is linear, we
can rewrite the expression for the optimal stand-alone surcharge as:
s∗it = −k + cA −
1
γi
QAit (9)
The partial derivative γi =
∂QAi
∂si
is the slope of residual demand for foreign ATM transactions with
respect to surcharges. With data on ATM fees and transactions, it is possible to estimate the
slope of residual demand γi in the vein of Baker and Bresnahan (1988). Their approach specifies
a relationship between quantity demanded, own prices, competitors’ prices, and controls.31 In our
case, we estimate the demand for foreign ATM transactions with respect to surcharges using the
following specification:
ATMTransit = α+ γ1ForCostit + γ2ForCostit · Largei (10)
+γnForCostit ·Density qtileit + δ1ForCost−i,t
+δ2CardsperATMit + δ3 lnATMsit
+Surch96it + μi + ηt + εit,
where ATMTransit is the (monthly) number of transactions per ATM and ForCostit is the foreign
ATM cost for bank i’s ATMs (the own price).32 Because we focus on what drives cross-sectional
variation in surcharges–in particular, whether high fees for large banks reflect strategic behavior–
we allow the slope of the residual demand to vary by firm size.33 This allows us to identify whether
30Some of this change is the result of greater ATM deployment; we control for this in the empirical work below.
31Baker and Bresnahan use a double-log specification, which yields elasticities directly. We can not employ this
specification because sit = 0 for the years prior to surcharging.
32ForCost is the bank’s own surcharge plus our estimate of its competitors’ foreign fees. We have also use
specifications with only the surcharge; the results are nearly identical.
33We are agnostic about the direction of such a diﬀerence. We might expect that the least price-sensitive customers
would sort into large banks, to avoid paying surcharges. This would increase the elasticity of foreign transaction
demand for large banks, because a large bank’s foreign transactions would be made by the price-sensitive customers
of small banks and vice versa. On the other hand, we remain open to the possibility that large banks face less elastic
demand–perhaps because they deploy their ATMs in superior locations.
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the cross-sectional variation in surcharges is driven by diﬀerences in residual demand or diﬀerences
in the level of strategic incompatibility. We also allow the slope of residual demand to vary based
on the population density quintile of a bank’s local market(s). The estimated slope of residual
demand bγi for a given bank will then depend not only on the first term γ1 but on the parameter
vector [γ1, γ2, γn]. In unreported results, we have experimented with a variety of other functional
forms for the slope of residual demand; the general pattern of results remains the same.34
Although the dependent variable ATMTransit is bank i’s total ATM transactions rather than
its foreign transactions, the parameter γi should estimate
∂QAi
∂si
because usage of bank i’s ATMs by
its own customers should be invariant to its surcharge (which is never paid by its own customers).35
The other variables are intended to control for other factors influencing transactions. ForCost−i,t
is the foreign ATM cost on other ATMs in bank i’s local markets (the cross-price). CardsperATMit
is the bank’s total number of ATM cards divided by its total transactions; all else equal, a bank
with more cards per ATM will have more transactions per ATM (we do allow for the endogeneity
of this variable). We also include the bank’s total number of ATMs to control for any within-firm
changes in total ATM deployment and the eﬀects of such deployment on transaction volume. The
variable Surch96it measures the share of bank i’s deposits in states that allow surcharging before
1997.36 The specification includes both fixed firm eﬀects, μi, and fixed year eﬀects, ηt.
The primary econometric issue in these models is that ForCostit and CardsperATMit should
be treated as endogenous, as will any variable interacted with one of these (such as Largei).
37 It is
likely that there is a component of ATM demand that is observed by the firm, but unobserved to
the econometrician. Because the firm observes this, its equilibrium surcharges may be aﬀected, as
might its card and ATM supply decisions. The fixed bank and year eﬀects included in the residual
demand equation will absorb unobserved demand components that are constant within firm, as well
as general changes in the demand for ATM transactions across years. A good instrument therefore
will be correlated with cross-sectional diﬀerences in how surcharges and ATM deployment changed
within firms over time, but uncorrelated with the unobserved component of demand.
With this in mind, we interact a number of variables reflecting cross-sectional diﬀerences in
34We have also allowed the slope to vary by population density tertile or quartile rather than quintile. We have
also used finer size categories.
35More precisely, we can write total demand as the sum of demand by own and foreign customers: QTit = Q
O
it+Q
A
it.
Thus, ∂Q
T
∂si
= ∂Q
O
∂si
+ ∂Q
A
∂si
and if ∂Q
O
∂si
= 0, then ∂Q
T
∂si
= ∂Q
A
∂si
.
36Ideally, we would measure whether the bank actually surcharged prior to 1997, but those data are not available.
But to the extent that banks do surcharge in other states, transaction volume will be aﬀected.
37We have also treated ln(ATMs) as endogenous. This increases all of the estimated standard errors in the model
but does not change the point estimate on the slope of residual demand.
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organizational structure and market conditions with a set of year eﬀects. In particular, we include
a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is a holding company that owns multiple subsidiaries
(this is essentially a size instrument), the share of the bank’s branches in Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) and population density in the bank’s local markets.38 Because the surcharge ban
constrained the degree of cross-sectional variation in ForCostit the interaction of these variables
with year eﬀects will capture changes in the cross-sectional diﬀerences in how a given firm’s sur-
charge behavior changed over time. For these to be valid instruments, we need that the relationship
between the demand for ATM transactions and these other variables is stable over our sample.
We have experimented with diﬀerent sets of instruments with little eﬀect on the results; this
is not surprising, as the primary source of identification is the transition from no surcharges to
surcharges; this is explained almost completely at the bank level by year dummies and year/bank
holding company interactions.
3.3 Residual Demand Slope and Elasticity
Table 2 shows results from our residual demand regressions. The first column shows results of
a simple OLS specification that includes only the own price variable ForCostit and the price
interactions. The second shows IV estimates of the same specification–as expected, the price
coeﬃcient becomes more negative. Model 3 includes competitors’ foreign cost, cards per ATM and
ln (ATMs). Model 4 includes the variable Surch96it measuring the bank’s pre-1997 presence in
states that permit surcharging.
In every specification, the estimated coeﬃcient on ForCostit is negative and statistically sig-
nificant. The large bank interaction is negative, suggesting that banks with higher market share
may face more elastic demand for ATMs. While the population density interaction terms are only
statistically significant for the densest quintile, the pattern of coeﬃcients suggests that demand is
less elastic in dense areas; this accords with the general pattern of results we have found in previous
work.39 Cards per ATM are positively correlated with transactions per ATM. The coeﬃcients on
the cross-price coeﬃcient and ln (ATMs) are not significant. The Surch96it coeﬃcient is nega-
tive and significant, as expected; its inclusion also makes the point estimate on ForCostit more
negative.
38These variables are all statistically significant in cross-sectional regressions with either surcharges or cards per
ATM as the dependent variable.
39Knittel and Stango (2004) find a systematic relationship between deposit prices, ATMs and surcharges in high-
density markets but no such relationship in low-density markets.
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Reading from the third column, we estimate an economically significant eﬀect of fees on trans-
action demand. We estimate that a one dollar increase in fees reduces foreign transactions per
machine by roughly 1000 per month. The 1000 transaction point estimate is quite large relative
to the typical number of foreign transactions per machine, which averages 2000 in our sample.40
Using this coeﬃcient estimate and those on the interaction terms, we construct our estimate of the
firm-level slope of residual demand bγi. In this calculation, we use surcharge and quantity data from
1999, the last year in the sample; this allows for the possibility that there was a gradual adjustment
to the surcharging equilibrium over the period 1997-1999. We then use bγi to estimate the optimal
stand-alone surcharges at the firm level using the formula in Equation (9). Doing so requires infor-
mation on interchange fees and marginal cost, and also requires an estimate of the share of total
ATM transactions that are foreign. For k and cA, we use values of $0.40 and $0.10. The $0.40 figure
is the median value of the interchange fee across networks.41 While we do not observe marginal
cost directly, it is quite low, involving only the incremental cost of switching the transaction over
the network; an estimate of $0.10 is probably on the high side. In any event, both interchange
and marginal cost are virtually identical across issuers, meaning that they do not aﬀect any of our
cross-sectional comparisons below. We assign each bank a share of foreign transactions equal to
the national sample average of twenty-five percent in 1999. If anything, this assumption causes us
to over-estimate sˆ∗it for large banks and under-estimate sˆ
∗
it for small banks (pushing against the
strategic incompatibility story), as evidence from later in the sample period suggests that large
banks have fewer foreign transactions as a share of their transactions per ATM.42
Table 3 shows summary statistics for our estimates of the residual demand slope bγi, stand-
alone surcharges sˆ∗it and incompatibility premia Zˆ
∗
i = si − sˆ∗i , again using quantity and surcharge
information from 1999.43 We show results for the entire sample as well as the subsample of banks
who surcharge. We also stratify the results by our large/small bank category. Large banks face
more elastic demand and have fewer transactions per ATM; both of these push sˆ∗i down relative
40While we do not know the bank-level breakdown of transactions per machine (own vs. foreign), we can infer
aggregate averages from data on how many transactions are switched by networks each month.
41This figure comes from reported interchange fees in Bank Network News. There is no evidence that large banks
pay interchange fees that are systematically higher or lower than those paid by small banks.
42The Card Industry Directory does not begin reporting bank-level information on foreign vs. own ATM transac-
tions until 2001. In that year, the average share of foreign transactions for large banks is 20%; for small banks it is
30%. (Both figures are presumably lower than they were in 1999).
43One issue we do not treat in this analysis is the fact that most surcharges are increments of $0.25, with modes at
$1.00 and $1.50. An alternative approach to the one we take here would account for such discreteness, but we do not
have a good model that explains why surcharges are priced this way. However, as long as bank size is not correlated
with some unobserved heterogeneity in how banks choose discrete prices, our cross-sectional results will still hold.
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to small banks.44 Large banks also impose higher surcharges. In concert, this leads to estimates
of Z∗i that are substantially higher, on average, for large banks. The results suggest that large
banks impose surcharges $0.28 higher than they would absent a strategic motive, while small banks
undercharge by $0.52 relative to the optimum; in both cases, we reject the hypothesis that the mean
strategic incompatibility premium Z¯i is equal to zero. Much of the latter negative eﬀect comes from
the fact that we include banks with no surcharge in the average; when we drop them, large banks
have an average premium of $0.66, while small banks have an average close to zero ($-0.02). For
this subsample, we still reject the hypothesis that Z¯i = 0 for large banks, but do not reject for small
banks; in other words, for small banks that surcharge, we can not reject the hypothesis that there is
no strategic incompatibility (as we measure it). We are somewhat circumspect about interpreting
the level of these estimates, which depend on our assumptions about k and cA; however, the cross-
sectional pattern that large banks have higher estimates of Zˆ∗i is independent of these assumptions,
and quite robust to changes in the specifications we use to obtain bγi. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate
these diﬀerences, showing kernel density estimates of Zˆ∗i for both small and large banks, and in
the second figure for only those who surcharge. Thus, the patterns we find are consistent with
the simplest prediction of the model: actual surcharges exceed stand-alone surcharges, and this
diﬀerence is positively correlated with market share.
3.4 Fitting the First-Order Condition
An approach that imposes slightly more structure on the data is to fit the first-order conditions in
equations 6-8 and ask whether pricing is more consistent with stand-alone profit maximization or
the richer condition that incorporates a strategic motive. Beginning with equations 6-8 and adding
a random component, we can rewrite the equation for the optimal surcharge as:45
s∗∗it = β1sˆ
∗
it − β2 (Aibγi)−1QCi + β3 (Aibγi)−1 + εit (11)
where
β2 =
∂pCi
∂si
(12)
44Although they are not of primary interest, we have calculated the corresponding demand elasticities in our sample.
Note that there are actually two such elasticities, because prices paid by consumers (ForCostit) do not correspond
to prices received by banks (si + k). We call the former the “consumer demand elasticity” and the latter the “firm
demand elasticity.” For large (small) banks in 1999, the consumer demand elasticity averages 2.9 (2.0) and the firm
demand elasticity averages 1.9 (1.2).
45While theory suggests a coeﬃcient restriction (β1 = 1), we relax the restriction here.
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β3 =
³
pCi − cCi
´ ∂QCi
∂si
(13)
The empirical question is whether this richer model fits the data better than the simple model
in which s∗∗it = sˆ
∗
it, which is equivalent to testing whether β2 = β3 = 0.
46 We estimate these
models using least squares and test the restrictions. We also estimate the model separately for the
subsamples of large and small banks, and in some specifications only for the subsample of banks
that surcharge.
Table 4 shows results from this model. As the second through fifth columns show, for large
banks the estimate of β2 is positive and statistically significant. For small banks (columns 6-9) β2
is not significantly diﬀerent from zero. Comparing the significance of β2 and β3 can in principle
identify the motive for strategic incompatibility, which may come from either higher deposit account
prices
∂pCi
∂si
or gains in card base
∂QCi
∂si
. Our results suggest that it is the former eﬀect that motivates
pricing here. We are somewhat cautious about making a definitive interpretation of the result,
because β2 and β3 are identified from a restriction on functional form.
3.5 Equilibrium Changes in Market Outcomes
All of the analysis to this point focuses on partial equilibrium incentives for incompatibility, and
how they distort pricing relative to stand-alone ATM operations. But because banks compete with
each other, the equilibrium eﬀects of incompatibility in the deposit account market are unclear.
Because we lack the data to estimate a fully specified model of equilibrium changes in deposit
account prices and quantities, we estimate three simpler reduced form models:
ln(QCi,99 −QCi,96) = α0 + α1Surchi + α2Zˆi + α3 lnCards96,i + α4Fee96,i (14)
+α5 lnATMs96,i +
5X
n=2
αnDensity tilen,96,i + εi
pCi,99 − pCi,96 = α0 + α1Surchi + α2Zˆi + α3 lnCards96,i + α4Fee96,i (15)
+α5 lnATMs96,i + αn
5X
n=2
Density tilen,96,i + εi
46We have also estimated models that attempt to include deposit account fees as a proxy for price-cost margins.
The coeﬃcient on the price variable is not significant.
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lnATMs 99i − lnATMs 96i = α0 + α1Surchi + α2Zˆi + α3 lnCards 96i + α4Fee 96i (16)
+α5 lnATMs 96i + αnDens tile 96i + εi
The dependent variables measure changes from 1996-1999 in ATM cards, deposit account fees
and ATMs, and correlate these changes with our variables of interest. We measure changes in cards
as a log-diﬀerence, and changes in deposit fees as the level change in dollars of revenue per $1000
of deposit balances per year.47 We also include the bank’s levels of cards, fees and ATMs in 1996,
along with its population density quintile.
These models estimate the correlation between our estimate of the incompatibility premium
Zˆi and changes in deposit account quantity (cards) or price. The central econometric concern is
spurious correlation between Zˆi and these changes. If Zˆi were completely mis-measured we would
see a zero coeﬃcient on the variable. Suppose, however, that some banks have high unobserved
quality (on ATMs and other dimensions). This would be reflected in both a high surcharge and
increases in deposit account price and quantity, and possibly an increase in ATM deployment. To
control for this possibility, we also include the actual surcharge. The exercise therefore compares
changes in ATMs and deposit market variables, holding actual surcharges constant–that is, of two
banks with surcharges of $1.50, one of which we identify as engaging in strategic incompatibility
and one of which we do not, which experiences the greater increases in ATMs, deposit price and
quantity?
We do not report the results of these models, in large part because we find essentially no
significant relationship between incompatibility premia and the outcomes. This holds even when
we examine subsamples by: large and small banks that surcharge, banks with an estimated Zˆi
above and below the median (conditional on surcharging) and banks that do not surcharge.48 The
47This measure includes direct revenue from checking account fees as well as foreign ATM fees. It does not include
checking account interest or the implicit return from the opportunity cost of funds. Using a broader metric of price
including one or both of these measures yields nearly identical results.
48One might wonder why we observe any banks without surcharges, given our estimates of the slope of residual
demand. While our results suggest that banks without surcharges have lower-than-average optimal surcharges, very
few have estimated optimal surcharges that are zero.
One explanation for this is that banks do receive revenue from foreign transactions through the interchange fee,
even when surcharges are zero. We may be underestimating the slope of residual demand at very low prices (it is
estimated at higher prices).
Another possible explanation is that at least some banks apparently use a “no-surcharge” pricing policy as a signal
that they generally have low fees (since surcharges are a more visible component of fees). One notable example of
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one exception is for ATM deployment; we find no systematic relationship between actual surcharges
and changes in ATM deployment, but a coeﬃcient on Zˆi of 0.38 for large banks, significant at the
5 percent level. The coeﬃcient for small banks is 0.27 but not statistically significant (and we can
not reject equality of the coeﬃcients for small and large banks).
4 Conclusion
Identifying situations in which firms use incompatibility strategically is critical for developing sound
antitrust and public policy toward compatibility. Here, we present a simple economic frame-
work for analyzing whether a particular form of incompatibility–an access charge for oﬀ-network
transactions–is intended to shift competitive advantage in a related market. Our results are con-
sistent with such behavior in ATM markets, but only for large banks. When we examine the
relationship between incompatibility and outcomes, however, we find no eﬀect; this suggests that
firms’ private incentives for incompatibility may lead to oﬀsetting results in equilibrium.
We see a few directions for future work in the area. First, our analysis largely abstracts from
the dynamic issues inherent in compatibility choice. In almost any market with network eﬀects
there are strong intertemporal demand links, both because of network eﬀects and often because of
switching costs. Incorporating these features into an empirical model would improve it. A second
limitation is that here we pursue a reduced form approach to many of the questions we raise (such
as estimating equilibrium eﬀects of incompatibility). Our small sample dictates this approach, but
with more data one could certainly place more structure on the model.
this is Washington Mutual, which features the fact that it does not surcharge prominently in its checking account
marketing (despite the fact that its prospective checking account customers should find other banks’ deposit accounts
more attractive).
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A Tables
Table 1: ATM Fees and Transactions for Large and Small Banks, 1994-1999
Variable: 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Large banks:
Surcharge – – – 0.79 1.06 1.25
Foreign fee 1.22 1.24 1.33 1.35 1.34 1.29
Transactions per ATM 5104 5092 4736 4000 3931 3510
Cards per ATM 1597 1511 1431 1306 1458 1303
N 65 90 81 79 50 62
Small banks:
Surcharge – – – 0.38 0.87 0.81
Foreign fee 0.94 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.09 1.03
Transactions per ATM 4680 4590 4609 4555 4203 4424
Cards per ATM 1653 1781 1732 1629 1526 1653
N 93 70 65 71 88 63
Source: Faulkner and Gray’s Card Industry Directory, various years. Surcharge is bank’s fee for
non-customers using its machines (the average of such the highest and lowest if the bank lists a
range). Foreign fee is the fee imposed by a bank when one of its customers uses another bank’s
ATM. Transactions per ATM includes both own and foreign transactions. Cards per ATM divides
total ATM cards by the bank’s base of active ATMs. “Large banks” are those with a deposit share
in their local markets above the sample median.
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Table 2: Residual Demand Estimates
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ForCostit -237.64** -1165.72*** -1061.84*** -1137.75***
(117.24) (360.39) (362.65) (390.48)
ForCostit · (Largei) -86.04 -161.03* -140.92* -146.49*
(65.70) (83.48) (83.41) (84.44)
ForCostit ·Dens2i 87.38 -62.00 -60.42 -41.93
(96.45) (128.29) (121.80) (122.23)
ForCostit ·Dens3i 73.73 145.45 172.46 175.49
(94.25) (116.18) (110.40) (111.32)
ForCostit ·Dens4i 27.22 52.48 39.04 54.13
(99.25) (124.17) (117.35) (118.80)
ForCostit ·Dens5i 133.03 311.53** 253.11* 273.89**
(105.35) (135.78) (131.03) (133.13)
CardsperATMit 1.07* 0.90
(0.62) (0.60)
ForCost−i,t 49.21 55.39
(143.23) (145.09)
lnATMsit 380.15 326.37
(288.50) (280.55)
Surcharges Allowed -385.14
Before 1996 (264.19)
N 877 877 875 872
Notes: Dependent variable in all specifications is transactions per ATM. All models include fixed
bank and year eﬀects. Model 1 is OLS. Models 2-4 instrument for ForCostit and the ForCostit
interactions using population density in local markets, share of deposits held in MSAs, whether the
bank is part of a holding company and interactions of these with year dummies. Models 3 and 4
also instrument for cards per ATM.
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Table 3: Estimates of the Incompatibility Premium
Large banks Small banks
All banks:
Slope of demand -1146 -950
Transactions per ATM 4073 4400
Estimated stand-alone surcharge 0.97 1.35
Actual surcharge 1.25 0.83
Incompatibility premium (Zˆi) 0.28 -0.52
p-value (H0 : Z¯i = 0) 0.07 0.00
N 62 63
Banks with surcharges:
Slope of demand -1154 -955
Transactions per ATM 3945 4309
Estimated stand-alone surcharge 0.92 1.29
Actual surcharge 1.58 1.27
Incompatibility premium (Zˆi) 0.66 -0.02
p-value (H0 : Z¯i = 0) 0.00 0.83
N 49 41
Notes: All data are from 1999. “Slope of demand” is the average across all banks of the estimated
slope of residual demand γˆi, using the coeﬃcients in model (4) of Table 2. “Estimated stand-alone
surcharge” is calculated as sˆ∗i = −k + cA − 1bγiQAi using k = $0.40, cA = $0.10 and assuming
that foreign transactions per ATM represent twenty-five percent of total transactions per ATM.
“Incompatibility premium” is actual surcharge minus estimated stand-alone surcharge. P-value
represent the p-value from a t-test where the null is that the Incompatibility premium is zero.
These tests abstract from estimation error.
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Table 4: Fitting the First-Order Condition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
β1 0.61*** 0.11 0.12 0.36 0.36 0.41** 0.43** 0.51** 0.51**
(0.10) (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
β2 -0.00 0.74*** 0.83*** 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.05 -0.00 0.25 0.20
(0.11) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
β3 -16397.81* -570.26 2802.03 4203.61
(9766.9) (11256.6) (3861.5) (3847.2)
r2 0.40 0.52 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.45 0.45 0.79 0.79
N 125 62 62 49 49 63 63 41 41
Bank sample All Large Large Large Large Small Small Small Small
Omit si = 0 No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Nonlinear least squares estimates of parameters in the first-order condition where
si = β1sˆ∗i − β2
Ã
Ai
∂QAi
∂si
!−1
QCi + β3
Ã
Ai
∂QAi
∂si
!−1
+ εi.
Model is estimated using 1999 data. If the model is specified correctly the parameters are:
β2 =
∂pCi
∂si
,
β3 =
³
pCi − cCi
´ ∂QCi
∂si
.
Models (1)-(3) impose the restriction β3 = 0.
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Figure 1: Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the incompatibility premium for large and small
banks.
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Figure 2: Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of the Incompatibility Premium for large and small
banks, for only those banks with surcharges.
